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Abstract
A network consisting of suppliers, agents, and distributors is considered. The flow of
orders and deliveries between the different elements are determined. A monotonic game [1]
for the customers in the network is described.
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1. Introduction
The article attempts to develop a numerical description of the supply and demand structure
for the deliveries of commodities in the network. We suppose that orders and deliveries be
met with conditions of uncertain overhead expenses. In certain situations, the orders and
deliveries do not match for a given supply and demand structure. In such cases, individual
participants in the network are assumed to act rationally with the object of maximizing their
profit.
Numerical analysis of such situations reveals, however, that the allegedly rational behavior
of the participants is not always such that they attempt to enter certain losing transactions so
as to additionally increase the profit from already profitable transactions (after offsetting the
negative effect of the former, of course). On the other hand, we claim that, if the participants
avoid all losing transactions, their behavior is certainly rational and the network in such
cases will be in a Nash equilibrium [2] .
All this suggested to allows us a series of computer simulations to perform. First, in order
to determine the possible response of the network participants to different supply and
demand structures. Second, in order to identify the participants where the executive efforts
might be applied to prevent distinctive actions that may misbalance the equilibrium in the
network. With this object, we used a model to construct an “elasticity” measure for the
choice of customers; this measure is represented by the overhead expense interval for which
the network remains in equilibrium.
2. Description of a distribution network: the chain model
The distribution of commodities in the network is characterized by sales figures that may
be expressed as one of the following three alternative numbers [3]: a) a demand h  which is
disclosed to the particular participant either externally or by other participant in the network;
b) a capable supply x  calculated at the cost of all commodities produced by the participant
for delivery outside the network or to the other participants; c) actual sales g  calculated at
the prices actually paid by the customers for the delivered commodities.2
Let us first consider the simplest case of distribution in a chain: this elementary model is
used at this stage solely as a convenient means of simplifying the presentation.
An order is thus defined as a certain quantity of a particular commodity ordered by one of
the participant’s from another participant in the network; a delivery is similarly defined as a
certain quantity of a commodity delivered by one of the participant’s to another participant in
the network. We assume that the network includes suppliers who are only capable of making
deliveries – the produces; participants, who both issue orders and make deliveries – the
agents; and the distributors, who only order commodities from other participants. 
1
In what follows we always consider the flow of orders and deliveries for the case of
“pipeline” distribution without “closed circuits.” Therefor, we can always identify a unique
direction of “flow” of orders from the distributors to the produces via agents and a “flow” of
deliveries in the reverse direction.
Let us consider in more detail this particular flow of orders and deliveries of commodities
in the network. The direction of the flow of orders (deliveries) is defined by assigning serial
numbers – the indexes  2 1,  and  3 – to the producer, to the agent, and to the distributor,
respectively. The producer and the agent act as suppliers, the agent and the distributor act as
customers. The agent thus has the dual role of a supplier and a customer, whereas the
producer only acts as a supplier and the distributor only acts as a customer.
The flow of orders to the produces from the customers is characterized by two numbers
23 h  and  12 h  . The number  wj h   ) , j ; , w ( 3 2 2 1 = =  is the demand  wj h  disclosed by the
customer  j  to the supplier  w . The flow of deliveries to the distributor is similarly
characterized by two numbers  12 x  and  23 x  , which are interpreted as the corresponding
capable sales. We assume that sales equal the distribution in this network.
Suppose that the demand of the distributor to the external customers is fixed at the level of
d  bank notes. The capable sales of the producer are  s bank notes. In other words, d  is the
estimated level of orders from the external customers and it plays the same role as the
number h  for the customers in the network. Similarly,  s is the intrastate level of estimated
deliveries by the producer, and it has the same role as x  for the customers.
                                                          
1 Note that in subsequent sections distributors naturally also act as suppliers to external customers.3
Let us now consider the exact situation in a chain. To make deliveries at a demand level of
d  bank notes, the distributor have to place orders with the agent in the amount of  d 23 23 n h =
bank notes, where  23 n  are the distributor’s cost of commodities sold (the cost per 1 bank
note of sales). The agent, having received an order from the distributor, will in turn place an
order with the supplier in the amount  23 12 h n ￿  , where  12 n  is the agent’s cost per 1 bank note
of sales. On the other hand, the estimated sales of the producer are  12 x  bank notes,  s 12 = x  .
Assuming that all the transactions between the suppliers and the customers in the network
are materialized in amounts not less than those indicated in the purchase orders, the actual
sales of the producer to the agent are given by  { } 12 12 12 , min h x g = ¢  .
Now, since the agent paid the producer  12 g ¢  for the commodities ordered, the agent’s
revenue is  12 12 23 /n g x ¢ =  , where clearly  12 23 g x ¢ ‡  . The difference between the revenue  23 x
and the costs  12 g ¢  is defined as  12 12 12 12 / ) 1 ( n n g p - ¢ =  .
From the same considerations,  { } 23 23 23 , min h x g = ¢  
2 give the actual sales of the agent to the
distributor. We similarly define the difference  23 23 23 23 / ) 1 ( n n g p - ￿ ¢ =  . The numbers  12 p ,
23 p  represent the profit of the customers in the network.
In conclusion of this section, let us consider the numbers  12 p  ,  23 p  more closely. We see
from the above discussion that the material costs are the only component of the costs of
commodities sold for the customers in the network; no other producing costs and no
overhead expenses are considered. And yet in Section 4 the numbers  12 p  ,  23 p  are used as
the admissible bounds on overhead expenses, which are assumed to be unknown. It is in this
sense we construct a model of a monotone game of customers.
                                                          
2 In subsequent sections,  wj g ¢  is replaced by  wj wj wj /n g g ¢ =  . The numbers g  and g ¢ differ in the units of
measurement of the commodities delivered to the user j . While g ¢ represents the sales at the cost, g
represents the same sales at actual selling prices.4
3. Description of a distribution network: the general form
Consider now a distribution network consisting of  n participants indexed  w ,
n ,..., , j 2 1 =  . The state of a supplier w is characterized by a  ) m ( 1 +  - component vector 
3
wn ,..., wk w w w , d y , d h h 1 + =   ) m k n ( = -  , the state of a customer  j  by a  ) v ( 1 +  - component
vector  vj j j j j ,..., , s x , s g g1 =  . The components of the  w w y , d  and  j j x , s  vectors are
interpreted as follows:  w d  is the total orders amount of the supplier  w acting as a customer;
j s  is the capable sales total amount of the customer  j  acting as a supplier;  wj h  is the cost of
orders placed by the customer  j  with the supplier  w ;  wj g  are actual sales (deliveries) to
customer  j  from the supplier  w . As indicated in the footnote,  wj g  represents the deliveries
valued at the selling prices of the customer  j  acting as a supplier. The vectors  w w y , d  ,
j j x , s  are the order and the delivery vectors, respectively.
With each participant in the network we associate certain domains in the nonnegative
orthants of the  ) m ( 1 +   – and the  ) v ( 1 +   – dimensional space. These domains are the
regions of feasible values of vectors  w w y , d  ,  j j x , s  in the  ) v m ( 2 + +  – dimensional
space.
For some of the participants vectors with  0 wj > g  are inadmissible, and for some
participants vectors with  0 wj > h  are inadmissible. Participants having the former property
will be called produces and those having the latter property will be called distributors; all
other participants in the network will be called agents. In what follows the numbers  w s
) k ,..., , w ( 2 1 =  characterize the  k  produces; the number  w s  represents the capable sales
controlled by the participant  w . The numbers  j d   ) n ,..., v , v j ( 2 1 + + =  correspondingly
characterize the  r  distributors: the number  j d  represents the demand to the external
customers  ) r v n ( = -  .
Let us now impose certain constrains on the admissible vectors in this network. The
following constrains are strictly “local,” i.e., they apply to the individual participants in the
network.
                                                          
3 k  is the number of produces, see below.5
The admissible network states are constrained by balance conditions equating the actual




1 w wj j s g   ) n ,..., k , k j ( 2 1 + + =  . (1)
We also require balance conditions between the cost of orders placed by all the customers
with a particular supplier and the demand figure of that supplier acing as a customer:
￿ + = =
n
1 i j wj w d h   ) v ,..., , w ( 2 1 =  . (2)
As we have noted above, the distribution network considered in this article does not allow
“closed-circuit motion” of orders or deliveries until a particular order reaches a producer or
the delivery reaches a distributor. The indexes labeling the participants in such networks are
ordered so 
4 that if  w is a supplier and  j  is a customer, then  j w<
) n ,..., v , v j ; v ,..., , w ( 2 1 2 1 + + = =  . Such networks are called a-cyclic, and their description
requires certain additional assumptions.
Consider the constants  0 wj ‡ a  and  0 wj ‡ b  satisfying the following constraints:
1
j
wj £ ￿a  ( ) v ,..., , w ; w j 2 1 = >  ,  1
w
wj £ ￿b  ( ) n ,..., k j ; j w 1 + = < (3)
For the supplier  w , the number  wj a  is the fractional cost of orders made to the customer
j  . For customer  j  , the number  wj b  is the fractional cost of the deliveries from supplier  w
which are necessary for meeting the sales target.
Suppose that purchase of orders in the distribution network move from distributors through
agents to suppliers. This flow is conducted at the wholesale prices. The deliveries (also
conducted at the wholesale prices) flow in the opposite direction. We express the effective
wholesale prices by a set of constants  wj n   ) n ,..., k , k j ; v ,..., , w ( 2 1 2 1 + + = =  , which
represent the participant’s cost per one bank note of sales for a customer acting as a supplier.
                                                          
4 The term topological sorting is used in [4] to describe the ordering of indexes having this property.6
The set of constants  wj a  ,  wj b  and  wj n  make it possible to uniquely determine the level of
orders and deliveries in a given transaction. Indeed, the level of orders to the supplier  w
from the customer  j  is given by  wj j wj wj d n b h =  . The relation (see Section 2) determines the
level of deliveries  { } wj wj wj , min h x g = ¢ , where  wj w wj s a x =  are the capable sales values at cost
prices. Considering the difference in revenue from sales of customer  j  acting as a supplier,
we conclude that the deliveries from the supplier  w to the customer  j  are given by
wj wj wj /n g g ¢ =  .
In conclusion of this section, let us consider one computational aspect of order and
delivery vectors in an a-cyclic distribution network. 
5 It is easily seen that the components




wj j wj w d d n b   ) v ,..., , w ; w j ( 2 1 = > (4)
￿ =
w
wj wj j wj wj w j / } d ; s min{ s n n b a   ) n ,..., k j ; j w ( 1 + = < (5)
The starting data in (4) is the demand of the distributors to external customers, i.e., the
numbers  n 2 v 1 v d ,..., d , d + +  . The starting data in (5) are the capable sales levels  k 2 1 s ,..., s , s  of
the produces, which together with the numbers  v 2 1 d ,..., d , d  from (4) are used in (5) to
compute the actual sales of the customers.
4. A monotonic game of customers in the distribution network
In the previous section we considered an a-cyclic distribution network with participants
indexed by  n ,..., k , k j ; v ,..., , w 2 1 2 1 + + = =  . The index  j  identifiers a customer; the index
w identifiers a supplier.
Let us interpret the activity of the network as a monotone game [1] , in which the
customers need to decide from what supplier to order a particular commodity.
                                                          
5 Here we need only consider the principles of the computational procedure.7
Suppose that in addition to the cost of materials, the customers bear uncertain overhead
costs in their transactions with the suppliers. Because of the uncertainty of overheads, it is
quite possible that in some transactions the overheads will exceed the gross profit from sales.
In this case, the potentially feasible transactions will not take place.
Let the set  j R  represents all the potential transactions corresponding to the set of suppliers
from which the customer  j  is to make his choice. The choice of the customer  j
) n ,..., k , k j ( 2 1 + + =  is a subset 
j A  of the set  j R  :  j
j R A ˝  ; the case  =
q A ˘ is not
excluded: it requires the customer’s refusal to choose. The collection 
n k k A ,..., A , A
2 1 + +
represents the customer’s joint choice. It is readily seen that the sets  j R  are finite and
nonintersecting; their union corresponds to set W  :  n 1 k 1 k R ... R R W U U U + + =  .
In what follows, we focus on the criterion by which the customer  j  chooses his suppliers
j A  . In distinction from the standard monotone game [1] , which is based on a coalition of
players, we will consider the strategy of individual customers whose objective is to
maximize the profit from the actual sales revenues. We will thus essentially deal with a
coalition-less m players game,  k n m - =  .
Let us first introduce a measure of the utility of a transaction between customer  j  and
supplier 
j A w˛   ) n ,..., k , k j ( 2 1 + + =  . The utility of a transaction between customer  j  and
supplier w is expressed by the corresponding profit  ) 1 ( wj wj wj n g p - ￿ =  .
The utility of a transaction with a supplier 
j A w˛  is a function  ) X ,..., X , X ( n 2 k 1 k wj + + p  of
many variables: the value of the variable  j X  is the choice 
j A  of the customer  j  , the
number of variables is  k n m - =  . To establish this fact, it is sufficient to show how to
compute the components of the order and delivery vectors from the joint choice
n k k X ,..., X , X 2 1 + +  . Indeed, according to our description, an a-cyclic distribution network
requires defining the constants  0 wj ‡ a  and  0 wj ‡ b   ) n ,..., k j ; v ,..., , w ( 1 2 1 + = =  that satisfy8
the constrains (3) . A pair of constants  wj a  and  wj b  can be assigned in a one-to-one









wj 1 b   ) n ,..., k j ( 1 + = (6)
If the constrains (6) are satisfied, then the same constrains are of necessity satisfied on the
subsets 
j A  of the set  j R  . Thus, if we restrict (4) and (5) to the sets  j j R X ˝  , the numbers
wj g  can be uniquely calculated for every joint choice  n k k X ,..., X , X 2 1 + +  .





wj wj j u p P  , (7)
where  wj u  are the customer’s overhead expenses allocable to his transaction with the supplier
j A w˛  ; we define  0 j = P  if the customer refused to choose –  =
j A ˘ .
The function  ) X ,..., X , X ( n 2 k 1 k wj + + p  has the obvious property of monotone utility, so that
for every pair of joint choices of customers 
n k k L ,..., L , L
2 1 + +  and 
n k k G ,..., G , G
2 1 + +  such
that 
j j G L ˝   ) n ,..., k j ( 1 + =  we have
) G ,..., G , G ( ) L ,..., L , L (
n 2 k 1 k
wj
n 2 k 1 k
wj
+ + + + £p p  . (8)
The property of monotone utility leads to certain conclusions concerning the behavior of
customers depending on the individual utility criterion. Under certain conditions, rational
behavior of customer  j  (i.e., maximization of the profit  j P ) is equivalent to loss avoidance
in every individual transaction with the supplier 
j A w˛  . This aspect is not made explicit in
[1] , although it is quite obvious. Thus, using the lemma in [1] , we can easily show that if
the utilities  ,...) X (..., j wj p  are independent of the choice  j X  , the customer  j  maximizes his
profit  j P  by extending his choice to the set-theoretically largest choice. In what follows we
will show that this result also applies under a weaker assumption.9
First, a few reservations about the proposed condition – see (9) below. This condition has a
simple economic meaning.: the customer  j  entering into loading transactions cannot achieve
a net increase in his utility of the losses. For example, if for fixed choices of all other
customers in the network, the utilities  ,...) X (..., j wj p  for  j X w˛  are independent of the
choice  j X  , the condition (9) hold as a strict inequalities. These conditions are also reduces
to strict inequalities when, for instance, the capable sales  wj x  in each transaction between
customer  j  and supplier 
j A w˛  is not less than the demand  wj h  so that every customer can
receive the entire quantity ordered from his suppliers. In particular, by increasing the
producers supply  k 2 1 s ,..., s , s  with unlimited manufacturing capacity, we can always increase
the capable sales to such an extent that it exceeds the demand, so that the conditions (9) are
satisfied.
We can now formulate the final conclusion: the following lemma suggests that each
customer will make his choice so as to maximize the profit  j P  , providing all the other
customers keep their choices fixed .
6
Let the suppliers not entering the set  j A  be assigned indexes  ,... , q 2 1 =  . Then the profit
j P  of customer  j  is represented by a many-variable function  ,...) t , t ( j 2 j 1 j P  with variables
qj t  varying on [ qj , 0 b ] . 
7 The value of the function  ,...) t , t ( j 2 j 1 j P  is the customer’s profit for
the case when the customer has extended the choice by placing orders in the amounts of
qj j qjd t n  with the suppliers  ,... , q 2 1 =  outside the choice  j A  . The set of variables  qj t
identifiers the suppliers  ,... , q 2 1 =  augmenting the customers choice  j A  . If all  0 tqj =  , the
choice  j A  is not augmented and the profit  ,...) 0 , 0 ( j P  coincides with (7) .
                                                          
6 The joint choice of users having this property is generally interpreted in the sense of Nash equilibrium [2] .
7 We recall that  qj b  is the fractional cost of all the orders placed with supplier q .10
The profit function  ,...) t , t ( j 2 j 1 j P  thus has to satisfy the following constraint: for every  qj t
in  ] , 0 [ qj b   ,... , q 2 1 =
,...) 0 , 0 ( ,...) t , t ( j j 2 j 1 j P P £ (9)
Definition. A joint choice 
n
o
k A ,..., A
1
0
+  of the network customers is said to be rational
with the threshold 
o u  if, given a level of overhead expenses not less than  0 u
o >  , the utility
measure 
o
wj u ‡ p   in every transaction of customer  j   with the supplier 
j
o A w˛
) n ,..., k j ( 1 + =  .





o A ,..., A S
1 + =  among all the joint choices
rational with threshold  0 u
o >   ensures that the a-cyclic distribution network is in
equilibrium relative to the individual profit criterion  j P  under the following conditions: a)
the overhead expenses  wj u  for 
o S w˛  do not exceed min wj p  over  j
o R S w I ˛  ; b) inequality
(9) holds.
The proof is given in the appendix.
In conclusion, we would like to consider yet another point. With uncertain overhead
expenses, the refusal to enter into any transaction may lead to an undesirable “snowballing”
of refusals by customers to choose their suppliers, see [1] . It therefore seems that customers
will attempt at least to conclude transactions with 
o
wj u ‡ p  , even when there is some risk
that the overhead expenses will exceed the utility  wj p  . Thus, without exaggeration, we may
apparently state that the size of the interval  [ ] wj
o min , u p    reflects the elasticity of the
customer’s choice: the number 
o
wj u min - p  is thus a measure of a “risk” that the customer
will get into non-equilibrium situation. Clearly, a customer with a small interval will have
grater difficulties to maintain the equilibrium than a customer with a wide interval.11
APPENDIX
Proof of the Lemma. Let 
o S  be a set-theoretically largest choice among all the joint
choices rational with the threshold 
o u  , i.e., 
o S  is the largest choice  H  among all the
choices such that 
o
n 1 k wj u ) R H ,..., R H ( ‡ + I I p  .
Suppose that some customer p achieves a profit higher than  p P  by making the choice
p
p R A ˝  which is different from  p




p u ,...) A (..., P p P  , subject
to  wp A w wp
o
p min u u p
˛ £ £  .
Clearly, the choice 
p A  is not a subset of 
o S  , since this would contradict the monotone
property (8) , so that  „
o p S \ A ˘ . By the same monotone property, the customer making the
choice  ) R S ( A p
o p I U  will achieve a profit not less than 
´
p P  . On the other hand, all
transactions in 
o p S \ A  are losing transactions for this customer, since 
o S  is the set-
theoretically largest set of non-losing transactions for an overhead threshold  0 u
o >  . For the
customer  p  making the choice  ) R S ( A p
o p I U  the profit 
´
p P  does not decrease only if the
total increase in utility due to the contribution  wp p  of the transactions  p
o R S w I ˛  exceeds
the total negative utility due to the transactions in 
o p S \ A  . Clearly, because of the constraint
(9) , the customer  p  has no such opportunity. This contradiction establishes the truth of the
lemma. n
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